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I. INTRODUCTION
In her Dunwody Lecture, Professor Anita Allen insightfully calls our
attention to the social contract tropes that pepper American case law.' She
claims that these tropes function ideologically, disguising politics, biases,
and raw power in judicial decision-making.2 To examine this claim, I
distinguish two versions of social contract theory Professor Allen groups
together. Metaphors drawn from classical social contract
theory-epitomized by the work of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau
may well function as Professor Allen suspects. Tools taken from twentieth
century neo-Kantian social contract theory-inaugurated and developed by
John Rawls-could have precisely the opposite effect. Rawlsian social
contract theory might function critically in case law, forcing judges to shed
unconsidered or irrelevant prejudices.
II. CLASSICAL SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
Professor Allen describes the essence of classical social contract theory
as follows: "Social contract theories provide that rational individuals will
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1986,
Brown University, J.D. 1990, Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1993, University of Michigan.
1. See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1
(1999).
2. See generally id. at 2-11.
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agree by contract, compact or covenant to give up the condition of
unregulated freedom in exchange for the security of a civil society governed
by a just, binding rule of law."3 According to Professor Allen, social
contract theorists regard the social contract as a legitimating device for
mediating order and liberty-a fair characterization of Locke's and
Rousseau's views.
Locke describes "what State all Men are naturally in," which he
describes as "a state of perfect freedom" and a "state also of equality."4 He
insists "that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their
own consents they make themselves members of some politic society."5
Locke proceeds to explain that people leave the state of nature because of
its tendency to degenerate into the state of war, "a state of enmity, malice,
violence, and mutual destruction."'6 "To avoid this state of war... is one
great reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state
of nature."7 Locke explains the tradeoff between freedom and safety:
The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural
liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing
with other men to join and unite into a community for their
comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another,
in a secure enjoyment of their pro!,erties, and a greater
security against any, that are not of it.
Writing almost a century later, Rousseau also sees the social contract as
a convention for accommodating liberty and safety.9
I suppose that men have reached the point where obstacles
that are harmful to their maintenance in the state of nature
gain the upper hand by their resistance to the forces that each
individual can bring to bear to maintain himself in that state.
Such being the case, that original state cannot subsist any
longer, and the human race would perish if it did not alter its
mode of existence.'"
3. Id. at 2.
4. JOHN LOcKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GovERNMENT 8 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ'g 1980) (1690).
5. Id. at 13-14.
6. Id. at 15.
7. Id. at 16.
8. Id. at 52.
9. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in THE BASIC POLITICAL
WRMTNGS 141 147-49 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publ'g. 1987).
10. Id. a
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Rousseau aims to describe a social contract that reconciles the two rather
than simply trades one off against the other-this is Rousseau's idea of the
general will." Rousseau still acknowledges, at least implicitly, that when
people gain under a social contract, they also sacrifice their natural liberty. 2
In Rousseau's words, "Once the social compact is violated, each person
then regains his first rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the
conventional liberty for which he renounced it."' 3 If one regains natural
liberty upon the dissolution of the social compact, then one must have
surrendered that form of liberty originally.
Professor Allen quite rightly says that classical social contract theory
portrays a wild, dangerous, free state of nature that is transformed, by the
consent of its denizens, into a civil society where the rule of law protects
everybody."4 Professor Allen also suggests:
In its mythic dimension, the social contract invites us to see
our rights and duties as more than merely human or local
conventions, even though they are recognizably at least that.
The state of nature and the social contract unite in a myth that
invites us to see our practices and the society that they
constitute as justified and just by virtue of inevitable rational
choices made against a background of risk and violence not of
our own creation.'5
Elsewhere, Professor Allen states: "Invoking the key elements of social
contract theory-the state of nature and the social contract-masksjudicial
and other governmental coercion in a cloak of consensualism and rational
self-interest."' 6 In short, Professor Allen charges that social contract theory
obscures judicial choice and power.' 7 This charge does not apply so readily
to Rawls' neo-Kantian social contract theory.
Ill. RAwLs' NEO-KANTIAN SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
Rawls quite consciously eschews the tropes that Professor Allen holds
most responsible for masking the choice and power available to judges.' 8
He replaces the historicist rhetoric of classical social contract theory with
11. See id. at 147-48. Rousseau describes the general will as, "Each of us places his person
and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one we
receive each member as an indivisible whole." Id. at 148.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See Allen, supra note 1, at 14.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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self-consciously counter-factual reasoning. 9 He rejects the metaphor of the
state of nature in favor of an openly constructed decision heuristic.2" Rather
than presenting his theory as a justification for the status quo, he offers it
to counteract the ever-present, unavoidable tendency of good-faith social
practices to degenerate into overall unjust results.2' Thus, if Rawls' theory
works as he intends, it is applicable to judicial decision-making. If judges
use it properly, it should have the opposite effects of the ones Professor
Allen attributes to classical social contract theory. Under the conditions just
outlined (admittedly difficult ones to satisfy), Rawls' theory of justice
should reveal that social arrangements, including those resulting from
judicial decisions, may or may not conform to the requirements ofjustice.
These revelations exert pressure on those responsible for these
arrangements to make them live up to these requirements rather than
provide excuses for their shortcomings.
Rawls is a Kantian. This shows in his emphasis on moral autonomy. 2
Rawls reinterprets the Kantian conception of autonomy, and this
19. JOHN RAWLS, POLTCAL LIBERALISM 23 (1993).
20. See id. at 24-25.
21. See id. at 22-28.
22. Rawls distinguishes the autonomy that is part ofKantian moral constructivism from his
own political constructivism, which he callsjustice as fairness. See id. at 99-101. He suggests that
there are four differences.
The first difference according to Rawls, is that in Kant's doctrine "the ideal of autonomy has
a regulative role for all of life." Id. at 99. Rawls, however believes that the ideal of autonomy is
not well-suited for providing a "public basis ofjustification." Id.
The second difference is that Rawls' political constructivism rejects what he terms Kant's
constitutive autonomy. See id. at 100. Constitutive autonomy displays the transcendental idealism
of Kant's philosophy by saying that the "independent order of values does not constitute itself but
is constituted by the activity . . . of practical (human) reason itself." Id. at 99. Political
constructivism says that "a political view... is autonomous if it represents, or displays, the order
of political values as based on principles ofpractical reason in union with the appropriate political
conceptions of society and person." Id. Rawls terms this doctrinal autonomy. See id.
The third difference is that justice as fairness relies on political ideas for its central
organization rather than transcendental idealism or other metaphysical doctrines. See id. at 100.
The fourth difference, according to Rawls, is one of aims. See id. His justice as fairness "aims at
uncovering a public basis of justification on questions of political justice given the fact of
reasonable pluralism." Id. Kant's aims are "showing the coherence and unity of reason... with
itself." Id. at 101.
Kant's conception of autonomy is based on freedom from determination as a result of
contingent circumstances in favor of determination through reason in the form of the categorical
imperative. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as Idea of Reason, in EssAYs ON KANT'S PoLmcAL
PH]LOSOPHY 15, 19-22 (Howard Lloyd Williams ed., 1992). Kant's categorical imperative is
expressed as the principle to "[s]o act that the maxim of your action could become a universal
law." See id. at 20 (quoting Kant's TBE DOCTRNE OF VTuE). Rawls' view of autonomy relies
more on the two moral powers possessed by all people, the capacity for a sense ofjustice and the
capacity for a conception of the good. See RAwLS, supra note 19, at 103-04. For more discussion
of the two moral powers, see infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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reinterpreted conception becomes the cornerstone of Rawls' theory of
justice.' According to Rawls, people judge autonomously when they
deliberate independently of contextual and mundane influences, and instead
exercise two "higher-order moral powers": the capacity for a sense of
justice (reasonableness) and a conception of the good (rationality).24
Reasonableness involves participating with others in fair terms of social
cooperation; rationality consists in identifying one's own ends and pursuing
them effectively.25 When people exercise their rationalitywithin the confines
of acting reasonably they achieve moral autonomy.26 More intuitively we
might say that we express our moral selves when we achieve the right
balance between answering to our own self-given goals and being
responsive to others' interests in pursuing their self-given goals.
According to Rawls, a well-ordered society possesses just basic social
institutions, which enable individual autonomy.27 In a well-ordered society,
basic institutions guarantee that members live on fair terms of social
cooperation.2" This leaves each free to pursue his or her rational life plan
without unreasonably infringing somebody else's like pursuit."
Substantively, Rawls' theory ofjustice aims to specify the fundamental
principles that would govern a well-ordered society.3" But to maintain his
commitment to our moral autonomy, Rawls must follow a method for
choosing these principles that itself respects autonomy.3 In other words,
he needs a way of deciding on substantive principles of justice that itself
respects and exercises our capacities for reasonableness and rationality.32
To address this need, Rawls offers political constructivism, which is derived
in part from Kantian moral constructivism.33
This method directs us to select principles ofjustice from a perspective
made well-known by A Theory of Justice.34 Here is a quick review. The
original position is a hypothetical choice situation occupied by parties
behind the veil of ignorance.35 The veil obscures a large amount of
information from the parties, who, nevertheless, select basic principles of
23. See RAwLs, supra note 19, at 99-107.
24. Id. at 103-04.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 107-08.
27. See id. at 257-59.
28. See id. at 35-40.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 40-43.
31. See id. at 72-81.
32. See id. at 103-116.
33. See id. at 89-129.
34. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICE (1971). These principles are
elaborated in PoLrnCALLmERAUSM, which is cited in this discussion. See RAWLS, supra note 19.
35. See RAWLS, supra note 19, at 22-23.
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justice that will regulate their actual society.36 The parties know that this is
their task.37 They also know general social facts and theory, including the
fact that their society enjoys conditions of moderate scarcity rather than
extreme poverty.38 They are aware that in actual society they each have
particular goals and interests and the capacity to pursue these.39 The parties
do not, however, know any specifics about themselves or their actual goals
and interests.4" They are not aware of the generation to which they belong,
the tastes and preferences they have, the substantive values they hold, or
the physical and mental abilities they possess.4 Knowing only that in actual
society, they each have some particular set of characteristics and
commitments, the parties in the original position choose principles ofjustice
to regulate the society to which they know they will all belong.'
Political constructivism thus specifies a viewpoint from which to decide
on basic principles of justice.43 Rawls introduces devices such as the
original position and the veil of ignorance to ensure that our chosen
principles ofjustice reflect our moral personalities and powers, rather than
other, contingent traits.44 The veil of ignorance allows the parties in the
original position to see that they are individuals with goals and interests and
the ability to pursue these, but prevents them from seeing their actual,
particular goals and interests and talents and skills.45 This means the parties
are motivated to select principles of justice that allow for the exercise of
rationality-one of the two higher-order moral powers-but only on terms
they are willing to accept without knowing what special advantages or
disadvantages they enjoy relative to one another.46 They are motivated to
choose reasonably, and thereby to exercise this other higher-order moral
power.47
Applying his own heuristics, Rawls arrives at two principles ofjustice
for the basic structure of society.48 These are well-known and I will simply
restate them here. The first, lexically prior, principle is the equality
principle, which requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and
36. See id. at 22-28.
37. See id. at 24-28.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 271-75.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 271.
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duties.49 The second is the difference principle, which allows social and
economic inequalities only if they improve the situation of the least well
offi ° Justice as fairness, Rawls' substantive theory ofjustice, requires that
the basic structure of society conform to these principles."
At this juncture, we can begin to appreciate important differences
between Rawlsian and classical social contract theory. Rawls avoids the
state of nature construct, in part because of its tendency to evoke an actual
historical moment when people gathered and consented to governmental
power, somehow binding future generations to the same rule. 2 Instead, the
original position is a viewpoint available in principle to any person at any
time. We step into it mentally and imaginatively, not literally. 4 We do so
to improve our judgment about what justice requires, in an effort to rule
out influences to which we might succumb despite their irrelevance to
justice.5
We engage in analogous processes regularly. For example, a young man
choosing friends might decide to consider his companions from the
viewpoint of his parents, on the ground that from this perspective certain
considerations will weigh more heavily-and others less-than they would
from his own. If, for example, the young man knows that he tends to
confuse bravado with strength of character and would prefer friends with
the latter trait rather than the former, he might ask himself how his parents
would interpret a potential cohort's claims to accomplishment-a strategy
that makes sense if his parents discriminate successfully between
unwarranted boastfulness and authentic fortitude. Adopting the parental
viewpoint is not necessarily a denial of choice or responsibility for that
choice. In fact, examining his potential friend from another perspective is
itself part of the process of choosing pals, a process in which the young
man has consciously decided to engage.
But, a critic might charge, if the young man simply defers to the parental
perspective, picking his friends accordingly, then has he not ducked
responsibility? And why privilege the parental viewpoint, which could very
well be authoritarian and coercive?
Certainly it is possible for a young man to unthinkingly accept his
parents' perspective on the world and then pass off responsibility for his
choices on his parents and their outlook. But if a young man critically
evaluates his parents' viewpoint and its appropriateness for judging
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Seeid. at271-75.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 274-75.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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potential friends, then adopting that viewpoint does not dodge responsible
choice. To the contrary, self-consciously adopting the parental viewpoint
because he believes it will improve his deliberation testifies to the young
man's responsibility.
The analogy to entering the original position to select principles of
justice should be clear. Rawls fashions the original position reflectively,
always allowing for the possibility that it must be revised in order to
function properly.56 The original position does not pretend a state of nature
that poses, in Professor Allen's words, "a background of risk and violence
not of our own creation."57 The original position is explicitly a constructed
vantage point, developed by us, to assist our critical thinking about
justice."8 It does not "invite[] us to see our practices and the society they
constitute as justified and just by virtue of inevitable rational choices."59
This is not to deny that someone could use Rawlsian rhetoric to evade
responsibility for her decisions about justice, just as it is not impossible for
a young man to borrow his parents' perspective on friendship and thereby
avoid responsibility for developing and relying upon his own. The point is
that the mere use of another perspective to evaluate options is not itself an
evasion of responsibility. If operated as Rawls intends, political
constructivism should make us more, not less, critical of our basic social
institutions and our intuitions about their justness. 60
Less well-known than original position, theveil of ignorance, and justice
as fairness, but equally important to political constructivism, is Rawls'
designation of the subject matter of a theory of justice.6 ' According to
Rawls, the proper subject of a Kantian theory of justice is the basic
structure of society rather than more particular transactions or
arrangements.6' Although Rawls makes this point in A Theory of Justice,
he elaborates and explains it in Political Liberalism:
An essential feature of the contractarian conception ofjustice
is that the basic structure of society is the first subject of
justice.... The basic structure is understood as the way in
which the major social institutions fit together into one system,
and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape
the division of advantages that arises through social
cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the legally
recognized forms of property, and the organization of the
56. See id.
57. Allen, supra note 1, at 14.
58. See RAWLS, supra note 19, at 271-75.
59. Allen, supra note 1, at 14.
60. See RAwLS, supra note 19, at 257-88.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 257-59.
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economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic
structure.63
Rawls designates the basic structure as the subject of a contractarian
conception not only for convenience. He argues for this choice of subject
matter on grounds of principle.
Rawls argues that establishing principles ofjustice for the basic structure
allows individuals and associations to conduct their private affairs with
confidence that background justice obtains." Just institutions can correct
for the inevitable tendency of microlevel transactions to erode background
justice.65 People can rationally pursue their personal ends without
constantly monitoring their arrangements for their reasonableness, trusting
that larger-scale social institutions will perform this function where
necessary.66 Rawls calls this "an institutional division of labor between the
basic structure and the rules applying directly to individuals and
associations and to be followed by them in particular transactions."'67 This
division of labor is not a trade-off, a sacrifice of liberty for order. Instead,
Rawls contemplates a system that maximizes the exercise of both higher
order moral powers, reasonableness and rationality.68
Rawls also claims priority for principles ofjustice for fundamental social
institutions, because these institutions play a unique role in molding our
individual conceptions of the good.69 We are born into our society and
cannot escape its influence on our eventual identities.7" We do not arrive at
our goals and interests independently of the sort of society we inhabit. The
basic structure of society and our place in our society together shape our
very identities. Our chosen ends vary accordingly. Different ends have
better and worse chances of being realized. Thus, by influencing who we
are and what ends we have, the basic structure of society affects justice at
a profound level.
IV. RAWLS' POLInCAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
AS A JUDICIAL HEURISTIC
For present purposes, let us assume that the Rawlsian choice position
does enable and ensure autonomous choice and that this is good and
appropriate when selecting basic principles ofjustice. And, let us agree that
63. Id. at 257-58.
64. See id. at 265-69.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 268-69.
68. See id. at 280.
69. See id. at 269.
70. See id. at 277.
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first principles ofjustice should apply to the basic structure of society and
allow that different principles might be suitable for other levels and settings.
Finally, let us accept that parties in the original position would select the
equality and the difference principles to regulate the basic structure.
The questions still remain: When, if ever, should common law judges
rely upon the heuristics of the original position and the veil of ignorance?
Is political constructivism right for judges? For Rawls, the answers would
depend upon whether the common law belongs to the basic structure of
society. Rawls' characterization of the basic structure, however, makes it
difficult to place the common law. The institutional division of labor
envisioned by Rawls presupposes a divide between large-scale social
institutions and small-scale personal arrangements. 7 The phenomenon of
the common law threatens to confound this distinction. The common law
is a large-scale social institution that emerges from series of court decisions
regarding smaller-scale, more personal, arrangements.
From afar, the common law appears as a body of case law that,
interpreted all together, regulates private conduct. In our society, this
corpus represents much-perhaps even the majority of-state regulation.
From this standpoint, the common law appears to be as fundamental as "the
political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, and the
organization of the economy, and the nature of the family," the "major
social institutions" Rawls specifically assigns to the basic structure.7 z
Moreover, the common law seems to fit the functional criteria for the basic
structure. Like the political constitution and the organization of the
economy, common law as a whole "assign[s] fundamental rights and duties
and shape[s] the division of advantages that arises through social
cooperation., 73 Cumulatively, common law decisions do not simply state
and apply rules directly to individuals and associations. Over time and
cases, the common law defines the playing field upon which individuals
conduct their lives. Common law doctrine creates default rules that
advantage certain parties rather than others. It carves exceptions to these
rules, permitting redress to some parties but not others. Individuals and
associations can, and generally do, take common law doctrines into account
when striking bargains or resolving disputes. Even in the absence of
litigation, the common law's assignment of rights and duties affects the
distribution of the advantages of social cooperation.74
Looking more closely, the role of the common law becomes less clear.
Under scrutiny, the corpus dissolves into a series of discrete trial court
verdicts and appellate decisions. The common law is not a unified system.
71. See id. at 257-59.
72. Id. at 258.
73. Id.
74. Cf id.
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It operates doctrine by doctrine across different fields of law in a myriad of
factual settings. At this level, we wonder, does each trial court verdict and
appellate decision belong to the basic structure? If not, does any particular
subset of the series?
Apart from careful analysis, it just seems absurd to place each and every
trial court verdict or each and every appellate decision on par with the
political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, the
organization of the economy, and the nature of the family." Examined
functionally, it still makes little sense to include each individual verdict and
appellate review in the basic structure. Singly, trial verdicts and the vast
majority of appellate decisions do not assign fundamental rights and duties
nor do they shape the division of advantages that arise through social
cooperation.76
Rawls contrasts the institutions that assign basic rights and duties and
distribute the benefits of social cooperation with rules that apply directly to
individuals and associations and their transactions. 7 7Common law appears
to fit both categories. Common law seems, paradoxically, to fall both inside
and outside the basic structure of society.
Finer-grained examination of some specific common law cases reveals
an alternative approach to dissolving the paradox and placing the common
law within Rawls' taxonomy. Court decisions themselves may be divided,
on substantive grounds, into some with relatively limited, microlevel effects
and others with large-scale, systematic effects. When judges resolve cases
of the second kind-call them basic structure cases-political
constructivism could guard against the influence of inappropriate prejudices
and allow judges to honestly yet fairly exercise their very real power.
V. EXAMPLES FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided Keener v. Dayton
Electric Manufacturing Co.7" The court joined the many other jurisdictions
that adopted strict liability in tort for products-related injuries in the late
1960s, advancing the then-prevailing justifications for this switch from a
negligence standard in such cases.79 Quoting the seminal case of Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,SO the court wrote: "The purpose of such
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers [and sellers] that put such
75. Cf id.
76. Cf id.
77. See id. at 275-78.
78. 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
79. See id. at 364.
80. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves."81 In keeping with this reasoning, the
Missouri court also adopted a very narrow affirmative defense to a
products liability claim.82 The defense, labeled by the court "contributory
fault," requires the defendant to prove that a plaintiff voluntarily and
unreasonably encountered the danger posed by the product.83 Early
decisions following Keener construed the knowledge requirement quite
narrowly, requiring the defendant to establish that the plaintiff discovered
the exact defect that caused the injury and proceeded to unreasonably use
the product. 84 Later decisions relaxed this interpretation, requiring only that
the plaintiff have known of the type of danger created by the defective
product.85 On either reading, "contributory fault" is a narrower defense than
contributory negligence, the traditional affirmative defense in a negligence
action. Contributory negligence is a purely objective standard, in that it
compares the plaintiff s conduct to the conduct ofa hypothetical reasonable
person. 6 If the plaintiff's conduct differs from the hypothetical conduct of
this character, the defendant prevails, regardless of whether the plaintiffwas
or was not actually aware of the danger she faced.87 Contributory fault is
a more subjective standard, in that it looks to the plaintiffs actual
knowledge.88 The defendant escapes liability only if the plaintiffreally knew
of the danger at hand and then unreasonably proceeded anyway.89
In 1983, the Missouri supreme court replaced contributory negligence
with comparative negligence in negligence actions in Gustafson v. Benda.9"
The Missouri supreme court decided its next major case involving strict
products liability, Lippard v. Houdaille Industries, Inc., in 1986."' There,
the court held that comparative fault principles did not govern strict
products liability actions in Missouri.92 The precise question before the
Lippard court was whether a plaintiff's culpable conduct would continue
to completely preclude recovery in products liability suits, particularly now
81. Keener, 445 S.W.2d at 364 (quoting Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901).
82. See id. at 365.
83. See id.
84. See Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 787 n.6 (Mo. 1977) (en banc);
Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 454 S.W.2d 611, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
85. See Ensor v. Hodgeson, 615 S.W.2d 519,525-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Uderv. Missouri
Farmers Ass'n, Inc. 668 S.W.2d 82, 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Wild v. Consolidated Aluminum
Corp., 752 S.W.2d 335, 339-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
86. See Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 513 (Mo. 1986).
87. See id.
88. See Keener, 445 S.W.2d at 365-66.
89. See id.
90. See 661 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1983).
91. 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986).
92. See id. at 491.
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that such conduct no longer barred a plaintiff's recovery in negligence
cases.93 The court held that neither contributory negligence nor its
successor, comparative negligence, applies in strict products liability.94 In
a companion case, Barnes v. Tools &Machinery Builders, Inc., the court
reiterated the distinction between contributory fault and contributory
negligence, deeming it error to introduce negligence concepts into a jury
instruction on contributory fault.95
Lippard is a five to two decision, with three separate concurrences and
two dissenting opinions.96 Barnes is also a five to two decision, with a
separate concurrence and one dissenting opinion.97 A very basic question
provokes all this discussion: If neither the victim nor the injurer is entirely
free from blame for an accident, should the costs of the injury be divided
between them, or should they be totally borne by either the plaintiff or the
defendant?
This question has attracted judicial and legislative attention in both
negligence and strict products liability cases. In Missouri, the supreme court
rejected contributory negligence-a complete bar to a negligent plaintiff's
recovery-in favor of comparative negligence-comparative apportionment
of damages between a negligent plaintiff and a negligent in Gustafson v.
Benda.9"
To appreciate the crisscrossing opinions inLippard and Barnes, it helps
to know the debate in Gustafson v. Benda. Two themes run through the
Gustafson opinions: the fairness of apportioning damages between a
culpable plaintiff and a culpable defendant; and the appropriateness of
judicial, rather than legislative, adoption of comparative negligence.99
Writing for four of the five member majority, Judge Welliver argues that
it was better to clearly shift to comparative negligence rather than try to
achieve apportionment of damages between negligent plaintiffs and
defendants through artificial tinkering with older doctrines."0 "[T]here must
be a better way to attainfairness and justice than to continue to indulge in
fictions in the application of a bundle of antiquated and fairly inflexible rules
of tort law."'01 Judge Welliver argues from the outset that fairness drives
the move toward comparative negligence.0 2 The connection between
93. See id. at 492-93.
94. See id. at 493 ("If the defective product is a legal cause of injury, then even a negligent
plaintiff should be able to recover.").
95. See 715 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo. 1986).
96. See Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 494.
97. See Barnes, 715 S.W.2d at 523.
98. See Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 14.
99. See id. at 13.
100. See id.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. See id. at 15.
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fairness and division of damages between culpable parties is one of the
Gustafson themes that recurs in Lippard and Barnes.
The other major theme from Gustafson that recurs in the later products
decisions is whether a move to comparative principles should be undertaken
by the judiciary or the legislature. 3 In Gustafson, Judge Welliver explains
that the Supreme Court had stated its preference for comparative
negligence in a number of decisions starting in 1977 and in these decisions
had asked the Missouri legislature to address the issue.' The legislature's
ensuing silence justifies judicial adoption of comparative negligence,
according to Judge Welliver.'05
Judge Billings' brief concurrence echoes both of Judge Welliver's
arguments.
Because I believe pure comparative fault is more equitable andjust than the ancient and harsh, all or nothing, rule of
contributory negligence, and the mathematical gymnastics
employed in last clear chance and humanitarian [Missouri
doctrines ameliorating contributory negligence] cases, I
concur. Historically, contributory negligence, last clear
chance, and humanitarian negligence, were born by judicial
decisions. By judicial decision we bury them." 6
This is the entire concurrence. Briefly but fulsomely, Judge Billings
underscores the fairness of comparative negligence and the propriety of its
adoption by the judiciary.
The two dissenting judges, Chief Justice Rendlen and Judge Gunn, do
not deny the superior fairness of comparative negligence." 7 Although they
write separately, these judges both maintain that the legislature, not the
judiciary, should adopt comparative negligence, if it is to be adopted.'
Lippard and Barnes revisit the two animating themes of Gustafson.
Writing for the majority in Lippard, Judge Blackmar-who was not on the
Gustafson court-distinguishes Gustafson because "[i]t involved only
negligence concepts, and could not be an appropriate vehicle for
determining rules of products liability law."'0 9 He rejects comparative fault
103. See id. at 14-15.
104. See id. (noting that the court had "remained quiescent more than five years while
waiting for the legislature to act.").
105. See id. at 15.
106. Id. at 28 (Billings, J., concurring).
107. See id. at 28-29 (Rendlen, C.J., dissenting); id. at 29 (Gunn, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 28-29 (Rendlen, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative inaction means
legislative opposition to comparative negligence); id. at 29 (Gunn, 3., dissenting) (arguing that
judicial adoption of comparative negligence violates separation of powers).
109. See Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 492.
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in products cases because "[t]he purpose of products liability law,
essentially, is to socialize the losses caused by defective products. 110 For
Judge Blackmar this answers the defendant's contention "that the rule of
comparative fault is a fair one in products liability cases just as in
negligence cases.""' Judge Blackmar does not say whether socializing
losses caused by defective products is a matter of fairness or some other
objective, such as economic efficiency. He simply argues that having the
plaintiff shoulder any of the costs of products-related injuries defeats the
goal of spreading these costs across the society of consumers."'
Although he addresses the fairness issue obliquely, Judge Blackmar
squarely confronts the allocation of powers question:
If there is dissatisfaction with our conclusion, the state and
national legislatures may be addressed. A legislature is far
more capable than we are of determining whether there are
problems in the products liability area, requiring changes in the
law. We adhere to the view that distributors of "defective
products unreasonably dangerous" should pay damages for
injuries caused by the products, without reduction because a
plaintiff may have been guilty of a degree of carelessness."
3
Judge Welliver, the majority opinion writer in Gustafson, dissents in
Lippard."4 This is not particularly surprising, since Judge Welliver so
adamantly defends comparative fault in the earlier case. 1 5 More unusual is
the emotional, portentous tone of Judge Welliver's Lippard dissent. Not
only does Judge Welliver maintain that Gustafson controls the issue in
Lippard, he insists that "principles of fairness ... demand the application
of comparative fault in strict products liability.""16 Judge Welliver accuses
the majority of"covert[ly] overruling" Gustafson, thereby "disregard[ing]
the long-standing principles of justice and fairness which Gustafson
embodied.""' 7  Judge Welliver concludes his opinion with an
"EPILOGUE-TO GUSTAFSON.""'  This extraordinary document
begins:
110. Id.
111. Id. at493.
112. Seeid. at494.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 491 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
115. See Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 13.
116. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 502 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 503 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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The fair, just, young Gustafson lies mortally wounded and
dying behind the curtain which has now been drawn on this
day's performance. You, dear audience of readers, have read
the eloquent words of each of the performers, words which
are now yours to judge as legal scholarship, legalese or
perhaps just legal gobbledy-gook. But, pray thee not conclude
that our brothers below speak with more enlightenment than
we.
119
Judge Welliver proceeds to sarcastically describe results reached by the
Missouri Supreme Court since Judges Blackmar, Billings, Rendlen,
Higgins, and Gunn joined it 2' (although by the time of Lippard, Judge
Gunn had become a federal district court judge).1 ' The epilogue then
implores the Missouri General Assembly to "deliver [us] from the Sargasso
Sea of the crisis of tort" by enacting tort reforms such as introducing
comparative fault in products cases and abrogating joint and several
liability. 22 Judge Welliver concludes, "With these small acts.., the General
Assembly can bestow upon you the fairest and most just tort system of any
state in America."23 Thus, Judge Welliver melodramatically links the
questions of fairness and legislative action in tort law. (Incidentally, Judge
Welliver gets the last laugh. In 1987, the Missouri General Assembly
enacted V.A.M.S. § 537.765, adopting comparative fault in products
liability cases.) 24
Two concurring judges inLippardwrite separately, primarily to chastise
Judge Welliver for his invective.'25 Judge Robertson, who concurs in the
result and was not a member of the Gustafson court, also writes
separately. 26 Judge Robertson argues that the court should never have
adopted comparative fault, even in negligence cases, because it should have
left that decision to the legislature.'27 While stare decisis convinces him not
to overrule Gustafson,2 ' he believes the court should refrain from
extending comparative principles to products cases.' 9
119. Id. (Welliver, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 503-505 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 505, n.8 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 505 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Welliver, J., dissenting).
124. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.765 (1997).
125. See Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 494-95 (Billings, J., concurring); id. at 495-96 (Rendlen,
J., concurring).
126. See id. at 496-97 (Robertson, J., concurring in result).
127. See id. at 497 (Robertson, J., concurring in result).
128. See id. (Robertson, J., concurring in result).
129. See id. (Robertson, J., concurring in result).
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Judge Donnelly dissents.130 He does not discuss the allocation of power
issues at all, concentrating entirely on arguments from precedent and from
fairness.' Judge Donnelly argues that both considerations favor adoption
of comparative fault in products liability cases.' 32 Notably, Judge Donnelly
concludes his opinion with quotation fromA Theory ofJustice, writing, "In
my view, a court should strive for fairness 'in assigning rights and duties
and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages."""3
In Barnes, the court's opinion-again penned by Judge
Blackmar-reiterates that comparative negligence does not enter into
products liability cases.'34 Judge Donnelly, again in dissent, again quotes
Rawls.'35 The lengthy quotation describes the original position and its
relation to justice as fairness.'36 Judge Donnelly then quickly claims that
Lippard "fails Rawls' test of fairness."' 37
According to Lippard, A and B, if in Rawls' "original
position," would say, each to the other: "If you become a
manufacturer and sell a defective product which injures me,
you, not I, will be responsible for my damages-even those I
cause." I cannot agree. In my view, A and B, if in Rawls'
"original position," would say, each to the other: "If you
become a manufacturer and sell a defective product which
injures me, each ofus shall bear responsibility in proportion to
his fault.' 38
Professor Allen refers to Judge Donnelly's dissent in Barnes when she
mentions "the Missouri judge who used John Rawls' A Theory of Justice
as an unlikely framework for crafting a dissenting opinion in a products
liability case."'39 While Judge Donnelly's application of Rawls' heuristic is
both hasty and conclusory, the Gustafson-Barnes line of cases suggests that
political constructivism is not so unlikely a framework for deciding how to
allocate losses arising from accidental injuries.
In Gustafson, Lippard, and Barnes the justices write as though they are
deciding issues of basic fairness. At least two members of the Supreme
Court of Missouri explicitly note the systemic distributional effects of
130. See id. at 497-500 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 499-500 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
132. See id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 500 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (quoting RAWLS, supra note 34, at 10).
134. See Barnes, 715 S.W.2d at 521.
135. See id. at 523-24 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
136. See id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (quoting RAwLs, supra note 34, at 11-12).
137. Id. at 524 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
139. See Allen, supra note 1, at 18.
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adopting or rejecting comparative fault in products cases. Judge Blackmar
indicates that comparative fault would undermine the distributional goal of
socializing losses from injuries caused by defective products. 40 Justice
Welliver calls for comparative fault to decrease the prices of products. 14
VI. CONCLUSION-A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL USE
OF RAWLS' SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
Of course, just because the justices think choosing comparative
negligence or comparative fault raises considerations of basic fairness, it
does not automatically follow that either of these doctrines occupy the basic
structure of society in Rawls' sense. I maintain, however, that in a modem
consumer society-such as ours-principles for allocating the costs of
accidents caused by defective products are indeed encompassed by the
basic structure as Rawls understands it. The market in products is a major
mechanism for distributing wealth, both in the form of profits from sales
and in the form of the goods themselves.'42 The products carry with them
risk of injury due to defectiveness. Those injuries that materialize impose
costs on a subgroup of consumers, regardless of whether any, all, or some
of the consumers use defective products carelessly. Since virtually
everybody in our society consumes some products, strict products liability
spreads the costs of these injuries more or less evenly across society's
members. Incorporating comparative fault into strict products liability alters
this roughly even distribution by allocating more of the costs to consumers
whose carelessness combined with a product defect to cause them injury.
Having careless plaintiffs shoulder part of the costs of the injuries they
suffer due to defective products deviates from the rough equality achieved
by strict products liability minus comparative fault. On a strict and thorough
Rawlsian view, the next step for a judge deciding such a case would be to
check the results against the two principles of justice that comprise justice
as fairness, the principles Rawls argues would be chosen by occupants of
the original position. First, a judge would have to decide which of the two
principles-the equality principle or the difference principle-applies. In a
case deciding whether to incorporate comparative fault into strict products
liability, ajudge would have to decide whether receiving total compensation
for an injury caused by a defective product is a basic right; or,
correlatively, whether one has a basic duty to compensate completely for
140. SeeLippard, 715 S.W.2d, at 493-94.
141. See id. at 505 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
142. My observations about the distributional effects of the consumer products market are
far from original. Guido Calabresi's landmark COST OF ACCIDENTS focused precisely on these
effects and the role of tort in regulating them. See generally GuiDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS (1970).
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an injury caused by a defective product one has manufactured. Personally,
I am not sure how to decide these questions; I do not know what makes
a duty or a right basic in a Rawlsian-or any other-sense. Presumably,
judges would be equally uncertain about the status of rights and duties of
plaintiffs and defendants in products liability actions.
If the rights and duties of injured plaintiffs and the makers of defective
products are not basic, a Rawlsian judge should consider whether the
distributional effects of contributory fault conform to the difference
principle. This means deciding whether adding contributory fault to strict
products liability makes the worst off better off.'43 To resolve this, ajudge
must identify the worst off-another murky project. If careless people with
the misfortune to experience injury by a defective product are the worst off,
comparative fault in strict products liability flunks the test of the difference
principle. If the worst off are impoverished consumers who pay more for
products because manufacturers must compensate in full even wealthy
careless consumers, then comparative fault passes. These hypotheses raise
a thicket of difficult empirical and normative questions.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of applying justice as fairness to choice
of legal doctrines, the Rawlsian method might still be worthwhile for
judges, focusing them on the right sorts of questions, even if they are tough
ones to answer confidently, let alone correctly. If we accept the equality
principle and the difference principle as substantively correct principles of
justice, and if we decide that at least some judicial results clearly affect the
basic structure of society, justice as fairness directs judges to focus their
debates, arguments, and ultimate justifications on equality and improving
the conditions of the worst off. This result seems at least promising and at
best sound.
But we may have doubts about the equality and difference principles,
and we may not agree that any judicial decisions involve the basic structure
of society. Does this mean judges must jettison political constructivism?
Not if we conclude that political constructivism provides a useful heuristic
for some or all common law decisions, even if these should not be
ultimately assessed according to the substantive principles of justice as
fairness. If political constructivism facilitates clear thinking about fairness,
then it may be useful for judicial decisions that implicate matters of
fundamental fairness broadly defined-that is, fairness in more colloquial
and less Rawlsian terms.
The Supreme Court of Missouri saw the choice between products
liability with or without a contributory fault defense as a matter of broad
fairness.' Yet for the most part the Missouri judges made conclusory
143. See supra text accompanying note 50.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 78-89.
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statements about the fairness of their preferred option or the unfairness of
its rival, rather than engaging in systematic analysis that would explain or
justify these conclusions. Employed carefully, political constructivism could
have helped. Imagine if each of the judges had tried to reason about the
decision from the perspective of the original position; and if each had
articulated why he thought that parties behind the veil of ignorance would
have agreed on one version of products liability rather than the other. This
could have prevented judges from simply hurling undefended assertions
about fairness at one another and permitted them to systematically critique
one another's reasoning.
Consider again Judge Donnelly's opinion in Barnes. On the line I am
pursuing now, the problem with the opinion is not that it uses an "unlikely
framework" for deciding the question at issue. The problem is that Judge
Donnelly really only mentions the framework rather than uses it, and to the
extent he does use it, he does so incorrectly. If judges routinely argued
according to the political constructivist method, other opinion writers could
have pointed this out and pushed him either to defend his conclusion within
the political constructivist method or to change his mind about the
outcome.
Judge Donnelly asserts that in the original position "A" and "B" would
have one of two exchanges. Either one would say to the other, "If you
become a manufacturer and sell a defective product which injures me, you,
not I, will responsible for my damages-even those I cause."'45
Alternatively, one would say to the other, "If you become a manufacturer
and sell a defective product which injures me, each of us shall bear
responsibility in proportion to his fault., 146 Without further explanation,
Judge Donnelly states that in the original position, A and B would have the
second exchange, not the first. 147
Judge Donnelly misconstrues the original position. All parties to society
occupy it, not just two individuals. The parties are not engaged in a series
of dyadic bargains with one another. Instead they are deciding which
general principles they can all accept, given that they know only general
facts about their society and human nature, but know nothing of their
personal circumstances, talents, and ends. If the parties' task is to design a
products liability regime, they must choose between principles such as,
"The costs of all injuries from defective products shall be paid by the
manufacturers of such products" or "Manufacturers shall pay all the costs
of injuries from defective products they have produced unless the user's
own carelessness caused the injury." Because parties in the original position
have general knowledge of society and human nature, they can infer that
145. Barnes 715 S.W.2d at 524 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
147. See id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
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manufacturers will pass along to consumers the costs of compensating
losses caused by defective products. They can infer that the choice of
principles involves a choice between (a) somewhat more expensive goods
for everybody and compensation for anybody injured by a defective product
and (b) somewhat less expensive goods for everybody and zero
compensation for careless users injured by defective products.
Precisely how the parties would compare the merits of these options is
open to debate. If, stripped of the sort of information hidden by the veil of
ignorance, people tend to be risk averse about suffering severe personal
injury and going without compensation, the parties will be more likely to
agree on (a). If people in this situation tend to fear having to pay more for
products or going without those that would be priced out of the market
without a contributory fault defense, and are willing to take their chances
of being the severely injured but uncompensated victim of a defective
product, they will probably agree on (b). What one cannot do from behind
the veil of ignorance is base his or her choice on whether he or she is rich
or poor, has or does not have other sources of help in case of injury than
payment from the manufacturer, is especially careful or careless, is an
accident victim or a manufacturer, likes corporations or dislikes tort
plaintiffs, and so forth. These are precisely the sort of facts the veil hides.
Judges imagining themselves in the original position face a hard
decision-that is, the nonobvious choice between (a) and (b) - but if their
judgment rests explicitly or implicitly on the sort of facts hidden by the veil,
it cannot be sustained. Judges will have to test their own intuitions about
the sort of risks parties in the original position would or would not be likely
to undertake and try to persuade one another accordingly.
Let me reiterate. Such debate would not be automatically resolvable.
Judges would still exercise judgment. But the political constructivist
heuristics make it harder to introduce controversial or irrelevant biases into
the process. This should address Professor Allen's major concern about
judicial use of social contract tropes-that they comprise "a myth that
invites us to see our practices and the society they constitute as justified and
just by virtue of inevitable rational choices made against a background of
risk and violence not of our own creation" and "masks judicial and other
governmental coercion . . ." political constructivist judicial opinions
demonstrate-rather than obscure-the exercise of judicial choice.'48
Moreover, by proscribing personal reasons, political constructivist
arguments force judges and their audiences to notice the centrality of
general social facts to these arguments. For example, political constructivist
arguments about a products liability regime highlight the current role of the
market in distributing consumer goods and compensation for injury. If
148. Allen, supra note 1, at 15.
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judges or their audience do not like the options such a market creates for
people in the original position, they may be motivated to push for changes
in the social arrangements that define these options rather than radically
different ones.
This point returns us to the other major theme in Gustafson, Lippard,
and Barnes-the distinctive roles of the judiciary and the legislature.
Judicial modifications of the products liability regime do affect the
distribution of goods and compensation. But only the legislature can enact
sweeping measures that would thoroughly alter the consumer products
market or the availability of compensation in case of personal injury. The
legislature could junk the tort system in favor of complete social insurance.
It could regulate product safety comprehensively and enforce its regulations
with fines that would finance a compensation fund for those hurt by illegally
dangerous products. A society with these institutions instead of ours would
present different issues of fairness. Political constructivism, however, could
be equally helpful to judges analyzing and settling them.
